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Abstract
We designed and carried out a field experiment in which we im-
posed social comparison incentives and technical recommendations
on student dormitories through electricity consumption reports and
energy-saving suggestions materials, respectively. Our findings are as
follows: 1) Regression results on all users show that the effect of social
norms is not statistically significant. 2) A social comparison message
has a heterogeneous effect on consumers’ energy use. Low and high
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energy users reduced their electricity consumption by 26% and 14%,
respectively, in the first week after the treatment. 3) The effect of
social norms is time sensitive.
JEL: C93; D10; Q41
Keywords: Social norms; Social comparison message; Energy saving be-
havior
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1 Introduction
Household energy consumption is one of the largest contributors to green-
house gas emissions among human activities (Jones and Kammen, 2011). A
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) report found that the harm-
ful gas generated from both commercial and noncommercial use of electric-
ity is more than a quarter of the total harmful gas emissions (EPA, 2011).
Economists and policy makers in energy sectors have focused on how pricing
and subsidies can affect energy consumption. However, a Pigovian carbon
tax or carbon emissions trading is politically not feasible in countries such as
the United States. In addition, measuring the effectiveness of an energy effi-
ciency subsidy requires knowledge of the demand elasticity of energy-efficient
durable products. Without these parameters, there are deficiencies with
subsidy-based programs. Moreover, a subsidy is also a depletion of limited
public funds (Allcott, 2011).
Non-price interventions can be more cost effective in reducing consumers’
energy consumption. Allcott (2011) evaluates a series of programs run by a
private company called OPOWER which sends neighbors comparison reports
on home energy consumption. Using a randomized natural field experiment
with more than 600,000 treatments and control households across the United
States, Allcott finds the average program reduces household energy consump-
tion by 2%, which is equivalent to a short-run price increase of 11% to 20%.
In addition, he finds a heterogeneous effect among high-end users and low-
end users. Households in the highest decile of pretreatment consumption
reduce energy consumption by 6.3%, while households in the lowest decile of
pretreatment consumption reduce consumption by only 0.3%. Social norms
have also been proved to be effective in other areas, such as recycling (Schultz,
1999), towel reuse (Goldstein et al., 2008), water consumption (Ferraro and
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Price, 2011), voting (Gerber and Rogers, 2009), retirement saving (Beshears
et al., 2009), and charity giving (Frey and Meier, 2004). See Farrow et al.
(2017) for a complete survey of the literature.
Although there is an abundant literature that finds social norm messages
are effective, there have been few studies of the long-term effect of social
norm nudging. Ferraro and Price (2011) finds the effects of social norms in
nudging people toward water saving persist after two years. Bernedo et al.
(2014) finds the effect of a social comparison message declines by 50% after
the first year. The effect is still observable after six years. Allcott and Rogers
(2014) studied the short- and long-term effect of home energy reports with
comparison messages sent by OPWER. They repeatedly sent home energy
reports and found there was a high frequency of action and backsliding. After
repeating the messages for two years, they found a persistent effect though it
declined by 10% to 20% each year. However, these experiments were almost
all conducted in the United States (Allcott, 2011; Allcott and Rogers, 2014;
Bernedo et al., 2014; Brandon et al., 2017). One exception is Torres and
Carlsson (2018), who ran a field experiment in Colombia to save water by
using social information and appeals to norm-based behavior. Can social
norm messages have the same effect in other developing countries such as
China? To the best of our knowledge, there have been no studies of the
effect of social norms on household energy consumption in China.
We ran a natural field experiment in dormitories at Xi’an Jiaotong Uni-
versity, China by sending social comparison messages about electricity con-
sumption. We found that a one-time social comparison intervention did not
lead to energy conservation on average. However, in the first week after the
treatment, the social comparison messages reduced the energy consumption
of the low-end users and the high-end users by 26% and 14%, respectively.
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In addition, we found the treatment effect disappeared in the second week.
This is consistent with Allcott and Rogers (2014) that only repeated social
comparison messages can have a lasting change on behavior.
Similar studies have been done in student dormitories. Delmas and
Lessem (2014) ran a field experiment in the residence halls at the University of
California-Los Angeles. They compared the effect of private information with
real-time appliance level feedback and social norm over usage with public in-
formation about conservation rating. They found the private information
alone was not effective. Public information combined with private informa-
tion reduced electricity consumption by 20%. Myers and Souza (2020) also
ran a field experiment in a college residence by repeatedly mailing the social
comparison Home Energy Reports (HERs) to dormitories. They find the re-
ports induced almost no behavioral change among tenants. Because tenants
in college dormitories do not pay the electricity bill, the authors argued that
social norms may not motivate behavioral change in the absence of mone-
tary incentives. Our experiment differs from these studies in the following
aspects. Firstly, student tenants in our experiment have to buy electricity
if they use more than the freely given quota; Secondly, we send the social
comparison message only once and in person. Thirdly, our social comparison
message is different from the HERs used in Myers and Souza (2020) and the
dashboard used in Delmas and Lessem (2014).
Our paper is organized as follows. We present a theoretical model in
section 2. Section 3 is the experiment design. Section 4 are the data and
results. Section 5 is the robustness check. We conclude in section 6.
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2 Theoretical model
Our theoretical framework is based on Levitt and List (2007). In the model,
an individual’s utility depends not only on wealth, but also on the decision
to do the right or moral thing. An individual i’s utility function can be
represented as
Ui(a, n, s;n) = ci(a; θ)−Mi(a, n, s; θ) (1)
where Ui is the individual i’s total utility; a is the individual i’s consumption
level; n is the perceived extent of social norms; s is the extent of the individual
i’s actions being scrutinized. θ is a vector of the individual’s characteristics;
ci is the consumption utility; Mi is the individual i’s moral cost.
In this model, the moral cost depends on the moral return related to an
individual’s activities. An activity that is immoral, antisocial, or conflicts
with the individual’s identity imposes a moral cost. The moral cost varies
by individuals and societies. In practice, many factors affect the moral cost
associated with an activity. For example, when an individual’s action imposes
an externality on others, the larger the negative externality it generates, the
higher is the moral cost. In addition, the extent of the scrutiny the action
is under also has impacts on the moral cost. When a consumer’s utility
maximization problem has a moral cost, she will deviate from the previous
utility maximization problem and choose an action with a low moral cost.
When an individual abides by different moral codes, she will choose different
actions when facing the same decision problem(Frey et al., 1996).
We assume the consumption utility is increasing and concave in consump-
tion a. The moral costM depends not only on consumption a, but also on the
extent to which the action is under scrutiny, and the extent of the perception
of the social norm. The moral cost increases with both s and n. A utility
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maximizing individual faces the choice of consumption a. We assume M is
increasing and convex in a. A social comparison message will increase the
extent of an individual’s perception of the social norm. A moral persuasion
message will increase the extent of her perception that her action is under
scrutiny. Both increase the moral cost of consumption. A rational individual
will choose to reduce her consumption and to increase her marginal utility
from consumption. When the marginal utility equals the marginal moral
cost, the consumption is utility maximizing.
3 Hypothesis and experiment design
3.1 Hypothesis
We studied the effect of social comparison messages and technical advice
for energy saving on consumers’ energy use. We tested the following three
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: both the social comparison messages and the technical
advice for energy saving are effective in promoting energy saving behavior of
consumers.
Hypothesis 2: The social comparison message is more effective than the
technical advice in promoting energy saving behavior.
Hypothesis 3: The effect of a social comparison message declines with
time and is heterogeneous among both high and low users of energy.
3.2 Experiment design
We had two treatment groups. We deliver an electricity use report in person
at period t = 0 to dormitories where the individuals in treatment group 1
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resided. We chose a Sunday night to deliver the treatment materials to the
dormitories. Most student tenants stay in the dormitory during this period.
We knocked on each dormitory and handed the materials to the residents in
person. When no one was in the dormitory, we put the materials through
the door with the face up. We tried to make sure student tenants would
see the materials when they entered. About 80% to 90% of dormitories had
a tenant inside. The report included the dormitory’s electricity use in the
previous week, the average electricity use among neighbors, and the relative
positions of individuals in the treatment group among their neighbors (see the
appendix A1 for a sample). Treatment group 2 received a moral persuasion
message with technical advice on how to save electricity at period t = 0 (see
the appendix A2 for a sample). Both treatments were administered one time
and electricity use was collected once a week afterwards. We also randomly
chose a control group with no treatment.
We obtained permission to conduct the study from the university’s logis-
tics department’s energy service center. We obtained weekly electricity use
data for three dormitory buildings. The tenants of the dormitories are female
graduate students. The dormitories are standardized and each has an air-
conditioner. There are no other large electrical appliances besides lighting.
Each dormitory does not have to pay electricity bill if it does not reach 190
kWh/semester (one semester is about 18 weeks). The experiment took place
from November 4 to December 23, 2018. We ran a pilot study before the
experiment with 69 dormitories in September. We calculated the sample size
with a power test1. We chose a sample size of 585 dormitories. We randomly
divided the sample into three groups with 195 dormitories for each group.
The treatment groups received the respective treatments from the beginning
1The results are available from the authors upon request.
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of the second week. After we had collected six weeks’ electricity use data, we
deleted those dormitories with zero electricity use for two consecutive weeks.
We also deleted dormitories that did not have precise reports of electricity
use because of problems with the smart meter equipment. In total we had a
sample of 575 dormitories. The experiment design is shown in table 1.
4 Data and results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
We collected the cumulative electricity use for each dormitory at the end of
each week for six consecutive weeks. We obtained the usage in each week by
first difference the cumulative data. The descriptive statistics of electricity
use are in table 2.
Table 2 shows the mean usage was 13.14 kWh, 13.23 kWh, and 13.37 kWh
for the control group, treatment group 1, and treatment group 2, respectively.
The median usage was 9 kWh, 10 kWh, and 10 kWh, respectively. We used
the two samples with equal variance t test and found no statistical differences
in usage among the three groups in the first week. The p values for the three
tests are 0.937, 0.844, and 0.902. The average use in the second week was
17.48 kWh for the control group, 17.11 kWh for treatment group 1, and 17.20
kWh for treatment group 2. The increase was driven by a large fall in the
temperature in the area of the study. The average high temperature fell from
14.5 degrees Celsius to 10.5 degrees Celsius. The average low temperature
fell from 4.6 degrees Celsius to 2.2 degrees Celsius. There was no heating
in the dormitories and tenants increased their use of the air conditioners for
heating. After the second week, the average electricity use started to decline
due to the beginning of collective heating. The use of air conditioners for
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heating decreased.
Figure 1 shows the average electricity usage was almost the same among
the three groups. In the second week, the average electricity use was lower
in treatment groups 1 and 2 than in the control group. From week 4, the
average electricity use gap between the control group and treatment group 2
declined and disappeared by the end of the sixth week. There is still a gap
between the control group and treatment group 1. At the end of the sixth
week, the average electricity use of treatment group 1 was lower than the
other two groups.
4.2 Regression analysis
We used the regression model in equation 2 to analyze the data.
Yit = α + γi + δiΣ
5
j=1weekj + β1di1Ti + β2di2Ti + ǫit (2)
where Yit represents the electricity use at week t for the dormitory i; γi is an
individual fixed effect variable. If γi is independent of all other explanatory
variables, equation 2 is a random effect model. weekj is a dummy variable
for time. weekj = 1 means the first week after the treatment. weekj = 0
means it is not in the jth week. If weekj = 0 for all j, it is in the first week.
Ti is a dummy for treatment. Ti = 1 means the dormitory i has received
the treatment; otherwise it has not received the treatment. di1 and di2 are
dummy variables for group. di1 = 1 means the dormitory is in treatment
group 1; di2 = 1 means the dormitory is in treatment group 2. If both di1
and di2 equal zero, the dormitory is in the control group.
We ran regressions with ordinary least square (OLS), fixed effect, and
random effect models. The results are reported in Table 3. In column (1)
OLS regression, the coefficients of interaction terms treat1×T and treat2×T
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which are the treatment effects are -0.291 and -0.121. The social comparison
message in treatment group 1 reduced electricity consumption by 0.291 on
average. The moral persuasion and technical advice reduced electricity con-
sumption by 0.121 on average. However, the average treatment effects were
not statistically significant. In the fixed effect model shown in column (2),
the average treatment effects became -0.380 and -0.346. In the random effect
model shown in column (3), the average treatment effects were -0.339 and
-0.244. The dummies for week are significant at the 1% significance level.
The average electricity use increased after the first week and then declined.
We used the Hausman test to compare the fixed effect and the random effect
models. The p value is close to 1 and we failed to reject the null hypothesis
that there are no differences between the estimates in the two models.
4.3 Low-end users
We categorized the lowest 25% electricity users in the first week as the low-
end users. The average electricity use and the change relative to the previous
week is displayed in table 4.
In the first week, the average electricity use was 4.69 kWh, 4.61 kWh, and
4.33 kWh for the control group, treatment group 1, and treatment group 2,
respectively. The p values from the two-sample equal variance t test are 0.30,
0.76, and 0.19. We found no statistical differences among the three groups,
which confirmed that our sample was randomly divided into the three groups.
After the first week of treatment, the control group’s average electricity use
increased by 118%, while treatment group 1 and group 2 both increased, by
79% and 96%, respectively. Figure 2 shows the treatment effects were large
in the second week and then declined. The average electricity usage among
the three groups was close by the sixth week. The treatment effect did not
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persist. We did not see the boomerang effect that was found in previous
research (Schultz et al., 2007). The average electricity use in both treatment
groups decreased relative to the control group.
We used the following regression equation 3 to do the analysis and it
confirmed our preliminary results.
Yit = α + γi + δweek + β1di1 × week + β2di2 × week + ǫit (3)
where week is a dummy variable. The panel data we used for each regression
had two periods. The first period was the first week without treatment; the
second period was the average electricity use from the second week to the
sixth week. For example, when we studied the sixth week’s treatment effect,
we used the data from the first week and the sixth week. week=0 represents
the first week and week=1 is the sixth week. We also included a dummy γi
to capture the dormitory fixed effect. We used the OLS, fixed effect, and
random effect models separately. The results are reported in table 5, 6, and
7. We used the Hausman test and found the p value is close to 1. We failed
to reject the null hypothesis that the estimates from both random effect and
fixed effect models are equal.
Table 7 shows the estimated coefficients for the interaction terms treat1×
week and treat2 × week are -1.833 and -1.607. In the week after the treat-
ment, the group that received the social comparison messages reduced elec-
tricity consumption by 1.833 kWh on average relative to the control group.
The group that received the moral persuasion and technical advice messages
reduced electricity consumption by 1.607 kWh on average relative to the con-
trol group. The average electricity use for the low-end users in the control
group was 10.22 kWh in the second week. Treatment groups 1 and 2 reduced
average consumption by 17.9% and 15.7% relative to the control group. In
the second week after the treatment, groups 1 and 2 reduced electricity con-
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sumption by 1.456 (20.3%) and 1.545 (21.6%), respectively, relative to the
control group. Although the treatment effects are not statistically significant,
they are large in magnitude. The treatment effects for the low-end users were
much larger than previously reported in the literature. Allcott (2011) found
a 0.3% reduction for the low-end electricity users. Ferraro and Price (2011)
found the social comparison messages reduced average water use of low-end
users by 2.72%. In the third to fifth week after the treatment, the treatment
effects were 8.43%, 5.74%, and 6.22%. The effects of the social comparison
messages and moral persuasion with technical advice both declined and did
not persist.
We compared the estimated coefficients in Week 2 and failed to reject
the null hypothesis that β1 = β2 (p = 0.788). For week 3, we also failed to
reject the null hypothesis that β1 = β2. There was no significant difference
between the treatment effects of social comparison messages and the moral
persuasion with technical advice.
4.4 High-end users
Users with the highest 25% of electricity use were categorized as high-end
users. Their average electricity use is summarized in table 8. In the first
week, the average electricity usage for the high-end users are 30.07 kWh,
28.69 kWh, and 26.59 kWh for the control group and treatment groups 1
and 2, respectively. Using the t-test with equal variance for two samples, we
failed to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between each
group’s average electricity use at the 5% significance level (p values are 0.605,
0.168, and 0.374).
Table 8 shows that in the first week after the treatment, treatment group
1 increased electricity use by 1% and treatment group 2 increased electricity
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use by 9%. Electricity use in the control group increased by 8%. The social
comparison message can reduce energy use. Figure 3 shows the average
electricity use begins to converge after the second week. Thus, the treatment
effect of the social comparison message declined.
We used OLS, random effect, and fixed effect models, and they confirmed
our preliminary observations. The Hausman test failed to reject the null
hypothesis that the estimated coefficients of the random effect and fixed
effect models are the same. We report the estimations in table 9, 10, and
11. In table 11, column week 2 demonstrates the social comparison message
and the moral persuasion and technical advice reduced average electricity
use by 2.628 kWh and 1.179 kWh, respectively. The effects of the social
comparison message and moral persuasion and technical advice were not
significant. However, the social comparison messages reduced electricity use
by 8.11% relative to the control group. Columns week 3 to week 6 show the
effect declined with time. The moral persuasion and technical advice reduced
electricity use by 3.64% relative to the control group in week 2.
5 Robustness check
We ran regressions with the full sample. We set dummies for both the low-
end users and the high-end users. In addition, we used interaction terms
with dummies and other independent variables. We compared the full sample
results with the separate sample results. The OLS regression model is defined
as equation 4.
Yit = α+δweekit+β1di1×weekit+β2di2×weekit+low+high+δL1di1×weekit×low+
δL2di2×weekit× low+ δH1di1×weekit×high+ δH2di2×weekit×high+ ǫit
(4)
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where low=1 represents the low-end users and low=0 for any other users.
high=1 represents the high-end users and high=0 for any other users. δL1
and δL2 are the treatment effects of social comparison messages and moral
persuasion with technical advice on low-end users relative to the middle users
(usage at 25% to 75% level). δH1 and δH2 are the corresponding treatment
effects on high-end users relative to the middle users. When the treatment
has no effect on the middle users, δL1 and δL2 are the average treatment effect
on low-end users. δH1 and δH2 are the average treatment effect on high-end
users. The regression model with individual fixed effect is defined as equation
5.
Yit = α+δweekit+β1di1×weekit+β2di2×weekit+low+high+δL1di1×weekit×low+
δL2di2×weekit×low+δH1di1×weekit×high+δH2di2×weekit×high+γi+ǫit
(5)
The regression results for the OLS, fixed effect, and random effect models
are shown in table 12. Data for the first week and the second week are used
in columns (1) to (3). Data for the first week and the third week are used
in columns (4) to (6). Using the Hausman test, we failed to reject the null
hypothesis that there are no differences in coefficient estimations between the
random effect and the fixed effect model. The OLS, fixed effect, and random
effect results show the low-end users reduced their electricity use by 2.680
kWh, 2.289 kWh, and 2.461 kWh relative to the control group in the first
week after the treatment. The OLS and random effect results are significant
at the 10% level. The average treatment effect for the moral persuasion and
technical advice is not statistically significant. For the high-end users, the
group that received the social comparison message reduced their electricity
use by 4.656 kWh, 2.98 kWh, and 3.720 kWh, which are significant at the
10% level, in the first week after the treatment. The group that received the
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moral persuasion and technical advice reduced consumption by 3.400 kWh,
0.063 kWh, and 1.456 kWh, which are not significant, in the first week after
the treatment.
In regressions using data for the first and the third week, the treatment
effects are not significant for both the low-end users and the high- end users.
The treatment effect did not persist in the second week after the treatment.
This is consistent with our previous results.
In sum, in the first week after the treatment, the low-end users who
received the social comparison messages reduced their consumption by 2.68
kWh relative to the control group. This is about 26% reduction relative
to the control group’s 10.22 kWh consumption. The high-end users who
received the social comparison messages reduced their consumption by 4.656
kWh, which is about 14% reduction relative to the control group’s 32.41 kWh
consumption. The results are robust across models.
6 Conclusion
Social norms have been proved to be an effective way of nudging consumers
toward environmentally friendly behavior. In this paper we report on a study
of the persistent and heterogeneous effect of social norms on consumers’ en-
ergy consumption. We found messages related to social norms reduce low-end
users’ electricity consumption by 26%, and high-end users’ consumption by
14% in the first week after treatment. However, the effects did not persist in
the second week. Our results are consistent with previous studies (Allcott,
2011). In addition, our treatment effects are larger than in previous stud-
ies. Allcott (2011) found the social norm treatment reduced consumption by
households in the highest decile by 6.3%, but it only reduced consumption of
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households in the lowest decile by 0.3%. Our results are different from My-
ers and Souza (2020), who also ran the experiment with dormitories. They
found the social comparison message did not lead to any behavioral change.
Delmas and Lessem (2014) found private social comparison messages did not
change dormitory tenants’ consumption, but public information worked well.
The differences may be because we ran the experiment with Chinese dormi-
tory tenants and their experiments were conducted in the United States. In
addition, we found the social norm message can also significantly reduce low-
end users’ consumption. There was no boomerang effect as found in Schultz
et al. (2007).
Our study also has some limitations. First, we used college dormitory
tenants, which are different from households. Second, our study lasted for
six weeks, a shorter time span compared to other studies such as Allcott
(2011) and Ferraro and Price (2011). Future research can study the effects
of a combination of different tools, such as social comparison messages and
moral persuasion. In addition, how to help middle-level users to conserve
energy is also an area worth future study.
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Appendix A1: Social comparison messages
Dormitory energy report
To dormitory XXX:
0
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t
Your electricity use is at 65.25%
Your dormitory’s electricity usage is 12 kWh in the past seven days. The
average electricity usage in the neighborhood is 13 kWh.
Note: The figure shows the dormitory uses less electricity than 65.25% of
dormitories.
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Appendix A2: Moral persuasion with techni-
cal advices (translated from Chinese)
Conserve energy, Everyone has the responsibility!
With economic growth and the increase in people’s living standards, elec-
tricity consumption becomes the second-highest besides water consumption.
Our society is depending more and more on electricity consumption. The
scientific and reasonable use of electricity has become a social problem. In
the summer, there are unprecedented heatwaves, drought, and heavy pre-
cipitation in many areas of the northern hemisphere. 2018 is one of the
hottest years in history. The extreme weather has great disadvantages to
human health, agriculture, ecosystem, and infrastructure. The mortalities
from floods and heatwaves are significantly higher than the previous years.
In many cities, the extremely hot days are much more than in previous years.
This is rare. Climate change is near us. The threat from an unbalanced cli-
mate is real.
The fifth assessment report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change shows human activity is the cause of global warming. If human be-
ings cannot control greenhouse gas emissions effectively, the trend of global
warming will likely continue. The risk is very high. Governments and en-
terprises are promoting green and low carbon development, and at the same
time, millions of people are practicing a low-carbon lifestyle. This is of great
help to the protection of the climate. We should start with small actions,
such as dressing, dining, housing, transportation, and travelling to be greener
with low carbon. For a safer and cleaner ”global village”, let’s take actions
together to protect the environment and govern our climate. Let’s respect,
follow, and protect nature, so we can live in harmony with our environment.
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(1) Set a reasonable temperature for the air conditioner: it is better to
set the temperature at 28 degrees Celsius. Setting the temperature higher
by 1 degree will save 0.5 kWh for every 10 hours’ running time. Using the
sleeping mode can save energy by 20%.
(2) Turn off the lights as you go. According to statistics, about 10% of
the residential electricity use is wasted because residents do not turn off the
lights when they leave. Please remember to turn off the light as you leave. In
addition, turn off electrical appliances when not in use. It will save electricity
and also extend the life of the appliances.
(3) Turn off your computer and the monitor if not in use. During the
break, use the computer’s sleeping mode. Unplug the computer when it is
turned off, otherwise, it will waste energy and reduce the computer’s life.
When listening to music or watching a movie, please use earphones instead
of an amplifier to reduce electricity use.
(Adapted from www.people.com.cn)
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Figure 1: Average electricity use by group
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Figure 2: Average electricity use of low-end users by group
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Figure 3: Average electricity use of high-end users by group
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Table 1: Experiment design
Group Size Treatment Starting period Treatment time Ending time
Control group 193 None Week 1 None Week 6
Treatment group 1 192 Social comparison mes-
sage
Week 1 Week 2 Week 6
Treatment group 2 189 Moral persuasion with
technical advices
Week 1 Week 2 Week 6
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of electricity use by groups (in kWh)
Group Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6
Control 13.14 17.48 10.52 9.83 9.56 7.63
n=193 9 15 9 8 8 7
(11.54) (11.59) (6.73) (6.05) (6.68) (5.32)
Treatment 1 13.23 17.11 10.27 9.64 9.18 7.36
n=192 10 14 8 8 8 6
(10.73) (11.02) (6.57) (5.70) (5.22) (4.51)
Treatment 2 13.37 17.2 10.32 9.79 9.46 7.67
n=189 10 14 9 9 8 7
(10.78) (11.59) (6.09) (5.17) (5.58) (4.91)
Note: for each group, the upper, middle, and lower number are the
mean, median, and standard deviation value of electricity use in each
week respectively.
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Table 3: Panel data regression results
OLS FE RE
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Treat1 × T -0.291 -0.380 -0.339
(0.332) (0.878) (0.474)
Treat2 × T -0.121 -0.346 -0.244
(0.336) (0.915) (0.476)
Week1 4.156*** 4.260*** 4.213***
(0.691) (0.612) (0.419)
Week2 -2.739*** -2.635*** -2.683***
(0.569) (0.700) (0.419)
Week3 -3.353*** -3.249*** -3.296***
(0.555) (0.700) (0.419)
Week4 -3.708*** -3.604*** -3.651***
(0.562) (0.723) (0.419)
Week5 -5.560*** -5.456*** -5.503***
(0.542) (0.724) (0.419)
Constant 13.24*** 13.24*** 13.24***
(0.459) (0.299) (0.334)
Observations 3,444 3,444 3,444
R-squared 0.136 0.294
Number of rooms 574 574 574
Note: Standard errors are robust; ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 4: Electricity use of low-end users by week
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6
Control group 4.69 10.22 7.16 6.12 5.84 4.76
(1.288) (8.353) (7.396) (4.043) (4.273) (3.490)
(118%) (-30%) (-15%) (-4%) (-18%)
Treatment group 1 4.61 8.24 5.67 5.54 5.46 4.56
(1.201) (3.634) (1.967) (1.785) (1.963) (2.084)
(79%) (-31%) (-2%) (-2%) (-18%)
Treatment group 2 4.43 8.48 5.54 5.54 5.41 4.35
(1.383) (4.491) (2.919) (2.842) (2.713) (2.497)
(96%) (-35%) (-0%) (-2%) (-20%)
Note: The upper number is the average electricity use. The middle number
is the standard deviation. The lower number is the percent change relative to
the previous week.
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Table 5: OLS model for low-end users by week
Variables Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6
Treat1×week -1.846 -1.468 -0.541 -0.360 -0.325
(1.269) (1.055) (0.615) (0.655) (0.571)
Treat2×week -1.656 -1.591 -0.553 -0.414 -0.421
(1.323) (1.010) (0.694) (0.708) (0.602)
Week 5.589*** 2.589** 1.551*** 1.281** 0.224
(1.152) (1.019) (0.565) (0.595) (0.490)
Constant 4.545*** 4.545*** 4.545*** 4.545*** 4.545***
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109)
Observations 286 286 286 286 286
R-squared 0.2265 0.0697 0.0676 0.0470 0.0037
Number of rooms 143 143 143 143 143
Note: Standard errors are robust; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 6: Fixed effect model for low-end users by week
Variables Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6
Treat1×week -1.753 -1.376 -0.448 -0.268 -0.232
(1.221) (1.030) (0.579) (0.614) (0.537)
Treat2×week -1.290 -1.225 -0.186 -0.048 -0.055
(1.258) (1.065) (0.635) (0.655) (0.547)
Week 5.442*** 2.442** 1.404** 1.135** 0.077
(1.106) (0.992) (0.540) (0.558) (0.450)
Constant 4.545*** 4.545*** 4.545*** 4.545*** 4.545***
(0.237) (0.196) (0.117) (0.122) (0.106)
Observations 286 286 286 286 286
R-squared 0.226 0.069 0.066 0.045 0.001
Number of rooms 143 143 143 143 143
Note: Standard errors are robust; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 7: Random effect model for low-end users by week
Variables Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6
Treat1×week -1.833 -1.456 -0.513 -0.335 -0.296
(1.262) (1.050) (0.594) (0.635) (0.549)
Treat2×week -1.607 -1.545 -0.443 -0.314 -0.308
(1.313) (1.094) (0.666) (0.685) (0.573)
Week 5.569*** 2.571** 1.507*** 1.242** 0.178
(1.123) (1.004) (0.543) (0.568) (0.458)
Constant 4.545*** 4.545*** 4.545*** 4.545*** 4.545***
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109)
Observations 286 286 286 286 286
R-squared 0.227 0.070 0.067 0.047 0.004
Number of rooms 143 143 143 143 143
Note: Standard errors are robust; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 8: Electricity use of high-end users by week
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6
Control group 30.07 32.41 15.02 14.30 13.07 10.07
(13.285) (12.79) (8.799) (8.520) (7.403) (6.158)
(8%) (-54%) (-3%) (-9%) (-23%)
Treatment group 1 28.69 28.87 15.31 13.64 12.29 9.80
(11.768) (12.369) (9.012) (7.649) (7.044) (6.126)
(1%) (-47%) (-11%) (-10%) (-20%)
Treatment group 2 26.59 28.93 13.56 12.69 11.91 9.48
(11.498) (14.040) (7.733) (5.830) (6.986) (6.252)
(9%) (-53%) (-6%) (-6%) (-20%)
Note: The upper number is the average electricity use. The middle number
is the standard deviation. The lower number is the percent change relative
to the previous week.
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Table 9: OLS estimation for the high-end users
Variables Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6
Treat1×week -3.542 0.288 -0.651 -0.779 -0.268
(2.656) (1.890) (1.710) (1.526) (1.297)
Treat2×week -3.483 -1.467 -1.610 -1.161 -0.587
(2.705) (1.687) (1.504) (0.461) (1.255)
Week 4.087* -13.29*** -14.03*** -15.25*** -18.25***
(2.174) (1.669) (1.636) (1.509) (1.377)
Constant 28.32*** 28.32*** 28.32*** 28.32*** 28.32***
(1.020) (1.020) (1.020) (1.020) (1.020)
Observations 286 286 286 286 286
R-squared 0.013 0.305 0.357 0.393 0.483
Number of rooms 143 143 143 143 143
Note: Standard errors are robust; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 10: Fixed effect model estimation for the high-end users
Variables Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6
Treat1×week -2.163 1.668 0.728 0.600 1.111
(2.052) (2.677) (2.802) (2.826) (2.769)
Treat2×week -0.008 2.008 1.865 2.315 2.889
(2.215) (2.757) (2.777) (2.867) (2.835)
Week 2.341 -15.05*** -15.77*** -17.00*** -20.00***
(1.573) (2.137) (2.288) (2.276) (2.237)
Constant 28.32*** 28.32*** 28.32*** 28.32*** 28.32***
(0.434) (0.530) (0.526) (0.548) (0.541)
Observations 286 286 286 286 286
R-squared 0.006 0.298 0.350 0.386 0.477
Number of rooms 143 143 143 143 143
Note: Standard errors are robust; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 11: Random effect model estimation for the high-end users
Variables Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6
Treat1×week -2.628 0.656 -0.361 -0.598 -0.134
(1.898) (1.770) (1.672) (1.508) (1.285)
Treat2×week -1.179 -0.540 -0.879 -0.703 -0.248
(2.071) (1.692) (1.532) (1.485) (1.282)
Week 2.929** -13.76*** -14.39*** -15.48*** -18.42***
(1.456) (1.581) (1.642) (1.535) (1.422)
Constant 28.32*** 28.32*** 28.32*** 28.32*** 28.32***
(1.022) (1.022) (1.022) (1.022) (1.022)
Observations 286 286 286 286 286
R-squared 0.010 0.305 0.357 0.393 0.483
Number of rooms 143 143 143 143 143
Note: Standard errors are robust; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 12: Whole sample regression results
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6
Treat1×week×low -2.680* -2.289 -2.461* -1.159 -0.768 -1.054
(1.572) (1.461) (1.495) (1.211) (1.178) (1.186)
Treat2×week×low -1.670 -1.260 -1.440 -2.020 -1.610 -1.911
(1.501) (1.379) (1.416) (1.250) (1.200) (1.220)
Treat1×week×high -4.656* -2.98* -3.720* 0.509 2.176 0.954
(2.796) (2.184) (2.087) (1.969) (2.728) (1.853)
Treat2×week×high -3.400 0.063 -1.456 -1.925 1.538 -1.000
(2.791) (2.277) (2.174) (1.783) (2.801) (1.776)
Treat1×week 1.113 0.825 0.952 -0.220 -0.508 -0.297
(0.888) (0.770) (0.803) (0.596) (0.576) (0.567)
Treat2×week -0.084 -0.071 -0.076 0.457 0.470 0.461
(0.707) (0.564) (0.603) (0.587) (0.551) (0.554)
Low -5.531*** -5.531*** -5.531*** -5.531***
(0.188) (0.188) (0.188) (0.188)
High 18.245*** 18.245*** 18.25*** 18.25***
(1.030) (1.031) (1.030) (1.031)
Week 4.563*** 4.660*** 4.617*** 0.233 -0.330 0.259
(0.474) (0.330) (0.353) (0.377) (0.335) (0.327)
Week×low 1.046 0.783 0.898 2.318*** 2.055** 2.248**
1.243 (1.150) (1.167) (1.708) (1.047) (1.052)
Week×high -0.475 -2.319 -1.510 -13.532*** -15.38*** -14.02***
(2.221) (1.601) (1.497) (1.708) (2.155) (1.610)
Constant 10.08*** 13.24*** 10.08*** 10.08*** 13.24*** 10.08***
(0.154) (0.145) (0.154) (0.154) (0.153) (0.154)
Time week:1,2 week:1,2 week:1,2 week:1,3 week:1,3 week:1,3
Model OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
Observations 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148
R-squared 0.577 0.0004 0.576 0.563 0.019 0.562
Number of rooms 574 574 574 574 574 574
Note: Standard errors are robust; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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